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1964] NOTES
MINERAL RIGHTS -EFFECT OF CONSERVATION UNIT
OVERLAPPING PREVIOUS DECLARED UNIT
In eight separate mineral leases on contiguous tracts plain-
tiff, lessee, was given the power to pool the acreage covered
thereby. Five leases contained general pooling clauses,' and
three were amended to give the lessee the power to pool in order
to create only the particular unit at issue.2 Pursuant to this
power, plaintiff, by filing a unit declaration, 3 formed a unit con-
taining acreage from all eight leases. Some three years after
the completion of a producing well on this unit, the Department
of Conservation created a forced unit which defined the produc-
tive limits of the reservoir from which this well was producing.
The conservation unit partially overlapped the previous unit,
excluding some portions of it as unproductive and including
other acreage which was not within the original unit.4 The well
drilled on the original unit was retained as the conservation unit
well. In a proceeding under the Louisiana declaratory judg-
ments act5 to determine the correct manner of distributing roy-
alties from the conservation unit attributable to the overlapped
acreage, plaintiff contended that all tracts in the original unit
should participate in such royalties according to the original
unit formula,' thereby maintaining in force all leases on acreage
1. The general pooling clause before the court read as follows: "Lessee, at
its option, is hereby given the right and power to pool or combine the acreage cov-
ered by this lease, or any portion thereof as to oil and gas, or either of them,
with other land, lease, or leases in the immediate vicinity thereof to the extent
hereinafter stipulated, when in Lessee's judgment it is necessary or advisable to
do so in order properly to develop and operate said leased premises in compliance
with the orders, rules and regulations of State and Federal Governmental author-
ity, or when to do so would, in the judgment of Lessee, promote the conservation
of oil and gas from said premises." Brief for Appellant, pp. 4-5, Humble Oil &
Ref. Co. v. Jones, 157 So. 2d 110 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963).
2. The pooling clause of the amended lease before the court read as follows:
"Lessee, at its option, is hereby given the right and power to pool or combine the
acreage covered by this lease with other lands, leases, or acreage, when in lessee's
judgment it is necessary or advisable to do so, to promote the conservation of gas
and/or condensate so as to create the following unit: [here follows a description
of the unit to be created]." Id. at p. 3.
3. This was an ex parte declaration by the plaintiff; no action by the lessors
was necessary in order to create the unit. The unit declaration merely recited
the leases involved and described the area which, pursuant to the pooling power
granted in these leases, was to be operated as a unit.
4. The original unit contained 160 acres; the conservation unit, 177.60 acres,
overlapping the original unit by 101.13 acres.
5. LA. R.S. 13:4231-4246 (1950).
6. Defendant's tract was comprised of 46.73 acres of the overlapped acreage.
Plaintiff's calculation of defendant's participation was as follows: defendant's
participation in the original unit (46.73/160.00) times the amount of production
from the conservation unit attributable to the overlapped acreage (101.13/177.60)
times defendant's lease royalty (3/16) or 3.1183 percent of total conservation unit
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within the previous unit.7 Defendant, lessor of a tract lying
wholly within the overlapped area, contended that the original
unit was superseded by the conservation unit, and that royalties
should be calculated on the basis of acreage contained in the con-
servation unit only." The trial court upheld defendant's conten-
tion; on appeal, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed.
Held, since the pooling clauses pursuant to which the original
unit was formed did not indicate that the parties intended par-
ticipations in the unit area to be frozen, the original unit was
superseded by the conservation unit; tracts excluded from the
conservation unit could not participate in royalties apportioned
to the overlapped area. Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Jones, 157
So. 2d 110 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1963), affirming original decision
in 125 So. 2d 640 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1960), writs refused, 159
So. 2d 284 (La. 1963).9
Customarily, pooling of oil and gas properties for the pur-
poses of mineral development is accomplished by two basic
methods - voluntary agreement of the parties, or forced pool-
ing orders by the Department of Conservation. ° Although there
production. Likewise, each tract within the original unit received its proportion-
ate share of royalties attributable to the overlapped acreage according to its par-
ticipation in the original unit.
7. Mineral leases generally provide that they will remain in force so long as
production in paying quantities is being achieved on the lands covered by the
lease or on acreage pooled therewith. Production was being achieved on the over-
lapped acreage by virtue of the conservation unit; thus if the original unit re-
mained effective, the leases on acreage within that unit but outside the conserva-
tion unit were being maintained by production on "acreage pooled therewith."
As a rule, leases contained either wholly or partially within the unit are main-
tained in their entirety ;by unit production. See LeBlanc v. Danciger Oil & Ref.
Co., 218 La. 463, 49 So. 2d 855 (1950) ; Hunter Co. v. Shell Oil Co., 211 La.
893, 31 So.2d 10 (1947).
8. Under defendant's method of calculation no consideration was given the
original unit, but defendant would receive the amount of production allocated to
his tract by the conservation unit (46.73/177.60) times his lease royalty (3/16)
or 4.9335 percent of total conservation unit production. By this method, tracts
within the original unit but excluded from the conservation unit would no longer
participate in production which heretofore had been distributed according to the
original unit formula.
9. The companion case of Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Edwards, 125 So. 2d 654
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1960), was consolidated with the instant case for purposes of
trial and appeal. Only two of the eight lessors of acreage within the original unit
were parties to the first suit. The Louisiana Supreme Court remanded the case
to permit impleading of all lessors as indispensable parties. 241 La. 661, 130
So.2d 408 (1961).
On appeal after the remand, the Third Circuit Court of Appeal affirmed their
original decision without opinion since "no new issues [were] raised." 157 So. 2d
at 112. In a memorandum decision denying writs of review after this decision,
the Louisiana Supreme Court stated: "we find the result is correct." 159 So. 2d
284 (La. 1963).
10. See generally Hussey, Pooling and Unitization - Government's Point of
View, SECOND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON MINERAL LAW 28 (1954).
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seems to be no universally accepted nomenclature differentiat-
ing between the various types of voluntary units," for the pur-
poses of this Note, "voluntary" units (as distinguished from
forced conservation units) will be further classified as "con-
tractual" or "declared." Contractual units are those formed by
the execution of a unitization instrument signed by all parties
whose interests are pooled; whereas, declared units are those
formed by a declaration of unitization by mineral lessees pur-
suant to pooling power granted in the lease. Basically the same
end result is achieved through either voluntary or forced pool-
ing: production from any tract within the unit is considered as
production from every tract, and is shared according to deter-
mined participations. 12
Formation of a conservation unit which includes acreage
previously within a voluntary unit raises a question as to the
proper method of calculating participations in production from
the conservation unit attributable to the overlapped area. 13 Al-
though valid pooling orders of the Department of Conservation
become part of all private contracts relating to mineral devel-
opment, 14 private contracts are superseded only if they are in
conflict with the conservation order. 15 The forced pooling order
allocates to each tract within the unit its proportionate share of
unit production ;16 but since the effect of the order is limited to
purposes necessary for conservation, 7 it has no conclusive legal
11. See, e.g., Humble Oil & Ref. Co. v. Jones, 157 So. 2d 110, 115 (1963)
(dissenting opinion); Comment, Mineral Lease-Voluntary Pooling Clause, 10
LOYOLA L. REV. 224 (1960).
12. LA. R.S. 30:10 (1950). See Horton, Effect of Conservation Laws and
Regulations on Contracts and Mineral Leases, 34 TUL. L. REv. 439 (1960). Al-
though this effect may not be automatic in voluntary units, it is generally pro-
vided in the unitization instrument; to fail to achieve this result would defeat
the purposes of unitization. See also Hussey, Pooling and Unitization - Govern-
ment's Point of View, SECOND ANNUAL INSTITUTE ON MINERAL LAW 28 (1954).
13. See notes 6 and 8 supra.
14. See Childs v. Washington, 229 La. 869, 87 So. 2d 111 (1956) ; Alexander
v. Holt, 116 So. 2d 532 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1959). The constitutionality of forced
pooling has been upheld as a legitimate exercise of the police power of the state.
See Ohio Oil Co. v. Indiana, 177 U.S. 190 (1900) ; Smith v. Holt, 223 La. 821,
67 So. 2d 93 (1953) ; Hunter Co. v. McHugh, 202 La. 97, 11 So. 2d 495 (1942).
15. "[I.]e., when the order is a conservation measure, pure and simple." Ar-
kansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Southwest Natural Prod. Co., 221 La. 608, 613, 60
So. 2d 9, 10 (1952). See also Delatte v. Woods, 232 La. 341, 94 So. 2d 281
(1957) ; Everett v. Phillips Petroleum Co., 218 La, 835, 51 So. 2d 87 (1951) ;
Crichton v. Lee, 209 La. 561, 25 So. 2d 229 (1946) ; Hardy v. Union Prod. Co.,
207 La. 137, 20 So. 2d 734 (1945) ; Hood v. Southern Prod. Co., 206 La. 642,
19 So.2d 336 (1944).
16. LA. R.S. 30:10 (1950) ; Smith v. Holt, 223 La. 821, 67 So. 2d 93 (1953).
17. LA. CONST. art. VI, § 1(c) ; LA. R.S. 30:4 (1950); Texaco, Inc. v. Ver-
milion Parish School Bd., 145 So.2d 383, 391 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962), modified
on other grounds, 244 La. 408, 152 So. 2d 541 (1963) ; Arkansas Louisiana Gas
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effect on the manner by which unit production once so allocated
is to be shared.' 8 Contractual unit agreements by which parties
agree to share any production from a designated area according
to determined participations do not conflict with the conserva-
tion unit, and, consequently, are not necessarily superseded
thereby.' 9 Obligations under a contractual unit are governed
by general contract law and subsist as long as the agreement
evidences that it was the intention of the parties that they re-
main in effect.20 Normally, the unitization instrument express-
ly provides that the parties intend for the contractual unit to
remain effective for as long as unit production is being
achieved. 21  However, it has been suggested that this intent
should be presumed or implied unless the parties expressly stip-
ulate to the contrary. 22
Similarly, there is no inherent conflict between a conserva-
tion unit and a declared unit, for a declared unit accomplishes
basically the same results as a contractual unit. However, the
lessee in creating a declared unit must exercise his pooling
power strictly in the manner and for the purposes stated in the
lease; action by the lessee exceeding the scope of this power will
not be binding on the lessor.23 Consequently, the validity and
effects of the declared unit are governed by the pooling clauses
Co. v. Southwest Natural Prod. Co., 221 La. 608, 60 So. 2d 9 (1952).
18. Arkansas Louisiana Gas Co. v. Southwest Natural Prod. Co., 221 La.
608, 60 So. 2d 9 (1952).
19. Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 234 La. 939, 102 So. 2d
223 (1958); Texaco, Inc. v. Vermilion Parish School Bd., 145 So. 2d 383 (La.
App. 3d Cir. 1962), modified on other grounds, 244 La. 908, 152 So. 2d 541
(1962). But see Alston v. Southern Prod. Co., 207 La. 370, 21 So. 2d 383 (1945)
Simmons v. Pure Oil Co., 124 So.2d 161 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1961).
20. See Monsanto Chem. Co. v. Southern Natural Gas Co., 234 La. 939, 102
So. 2d 223 (1958) ; LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1901, 1945 (1870).
21. E.g.: This agreement shall remain in effect "so long as Lease Owners
are producing gas and gas condensate or gas distillate from said Unitized Area."
Record, p. 130, Crown Cent. Petroleum Corp. v. Barousse, 238 La. 1013, 117
So.2d 575 (1960). "This agreement shall remain in full force and effect as long
as the mineral leases or contracts referred to herein shall remain in full force
and effect." Record, p. 45, Elson v. Mathewes, 224 La. 417, 69 So. 2d 734 (1953).
22. "Voluntary units formed through a complete agreement signed by all
lessors and lessees should not be subject to change by the Conservation Commis-
sioner's order unless the parties have expressly stipulated for this change in the
agreement. Here it is presumed that the parties intended to freeze their rights
because all of the parties participated in the confection of the voluntary unit
agreement, and where they agreed on certain fixed interests and did not contract
to have them changed, their contract should be the law of the contract." Texaco,
Inc. v. Vermilion Parish School Bd., 145 So. 383, 394 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962)
(concurring opinion), modified on other grounds, 244 La. 408, 152 So. 2d 541
(1962).
23. See Mallet v. Union Oil & Gas Corp. of La., 232 La. 157, 94 So. 2d 16
(1957) ; Wilcox v. Shell Oil Co., 226 La. 417, 76 So. 2d 416 (1954).
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of the lease rather than by the provisions of the unit declaration
which actually creates the unit.
In the instant case, the court, treating the unit as declared,
found from an interpretation of the pooling clauses that the les-
sors did not intend that their royalty interests be frozen by a
declared unit.24 The finding of this intent seems to have been
based on two principal factors. First, the court apparently gave
some weight to the fact that the parties had not expressed an
intent to freeze participations in any unit formed by exercise of
the pooling power. Second, the lessee's power was in essence
limited to purposes of conservation. 25 The court noted that the
primary motivation of the lessor in granting his lessee the power
to pool was "to obtain his just and equitable share of the oil and
gas in the pool and to prevent drainage of his land. ' 26 In view
of this latter consideration, the court held that the "parties
should not be presumed to have agreed to share their interests
on the old declared unit unless they show a specific and positive
intention to freeze the old unit.' 27 Since there was no such ex-
press intent, the court held that the declared unit was super-
seded by the conservation unit 28 and that royalties were to be
calculated on the basis of acreage contained in the conservation
unit only. Lessors of acreage within the declared unit but out-
side the conservation unit were excluded from participation in
production from the horizon subject to the conservation unit.
In view of the fact that the three amended leases had given
the lessee the power to create only the specific unit actually
formed, a vigorous dissent found the unit to be contractual
rather than declared and thus maintained that it should not be
superseded by the conservation unit. Although the majority ap-
24. In the original decision the court considered only two of the eight leases
involved; after all lessors within the original unit were impleaded as indispensable
parties, the court stated that no new issues were presented. Therefore, it is to be
assumed that the court found the same intent to be present in all leases on acre-
age within the original unit. See note 10 supra.
25. "[W]hen in Lessee's judgment it is necessary or advisable to do so to
promote the con8ervation of gas and/or condensate." (Emphasis added.) ; "[W]hen
in Lessee's judgment it is necessary or advisable to do so in order properly to
develop and operate said leased premises in compliance with the orders, rules and
regulations of State and Federal governmental authority, or when to do so would,
in the judgment of Lessee, promote the con8ervation of oil and gas from said,
premises." (Emphasis added.)
26. 125 So. 2d at 647.
27. Id. at 646.
28. The conservation unit, being effective for only one sand, superseded the
declared unit only as to that particular sand. Apparently the declared unit re-
mained effective for other horizons. 157 So. 2d at 111-12.
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parently regarded the unit as declared rather than contractual,2 9
its decision does not rest on this classification alone. Rather the
majority seemingly reasoned that it was the intention of the par-
ties to the leases that the unit would be terminated"0 by the cre-
ation of the conservation unit.3 1
Certain language in the majority opinion suggests that the
declared unit was superseded by the conservation unit because
of an inherent conflict between the two.3 2 It is submitted, how-
ever, that the objectives of the conservation unit would not have
been defeated by the continued existence of the sharing arrange-
ments under the declared unit. In this regard there was no con-
flict between the two units requiring the conservation unit to
supersede the declared unit.3
3
Based on the intent of the parties as reflected by the lease,
the decision appears sound.3 4 Since the lessee's power was limit-
ed to purposes of conservation, any unit which at the time of
29. See id. at 114 (concurring opinion).
30. "Supersede" carries the connotation of annulling or replacing because of
superiority; whereas, "terminate" carries a diffferent connotation of ending or
limiting in time without necessarily being superior. "Terminate" seems to de-
scribe more correctly the effect of the conservation unit on the declared unit in
the instant case.
31. From the fact that the parties did not intend the unit to be frozen, it
must necessarily :be implied that they intended it to be subject to termination at
a later date. As the court saw it, this contemplated termination was wrought by
the creation of the conservation unit. Judge Culpepper in a concurring opinion
said: "[W]hen the lessors signed such a pooling authorization they contemplated
that even though a unit might be declared it would be subject to change later by
order of the Commissioner of Conservation for conservation purposes." 157 So. 2d
at 114.
32. To allow the original unit to remain in effect "would be in conflict with
(plaintiff's] prior agreement forming the voluntary unit and with the conserva-
tion order which determined that the unit should contain 177.60 acres.
"To adopt plaintiff's position would also allow landowners whose lands are not
in an oil or gas reservoir to participate in royalties to which they are not en-
titled. This would defeat the very purpose for which the Department of Con-
servation was formed." 125 So. 2d at 648. (Emphasis added.)
33. See notes 17-19 supra, and accompanying text.
34. An alternative interpretation of the instant case suggests that the court
did not predicate its decision on the intent of the parties, but rather formulated
a rule of law that in the absence of a positive expression in the lease of an intent
that participations in any unit formed pursuant to the pooling power be frozen,
the unit would be terminated by a subsequent conservation unit. This theory
would dispense with the necessity of interpreting the pooling clause in an effort
to ascertain the unexpressed intent of the parties, but would necessitate formu-
lating a new rule to cover each and every event which one of the parties con-
tended operated to terminate the unit.
It is believed that this approach would be improper since the lease contained
sufficient language from which the intent of the parties could be implied. The
issue resolves itself into the question whether the parties intended the unit to
be an aleatory contract as a result of which their interests would be frozen, or
intended the unit to be effective only as long as it served its expressed purposes.
See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 1775, 1776, 1896, 1899 (1870).
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its formation did not accomplish these objectives would, in all
probability, be invalid.35 On the same basis, it seems that the
parties did not intend that a unit, although valid at its incep-
tion, would remain effective when it no longer was necessary
for conserving the mineral reserves under the lessor's tract.
From this interpretation of the pooling clauses in question, it
may be implied that the parties intended that any event which
proved that the unit no longer served the purposes for which it
was originally formed would terminate the unit.36 Since the
lessee's power was controlled by the pooling clause, he could not
form a unit which was not subject to dissolution when it no
longer served the purposes of conservation.31
Acceptance of this approach still leaves the question whether
mere issuance of the conservation order should conclusively
establish that the declared unit no longer serves the purposes of
conservation. 8 An affirmative answer seems compelling, for
otherwise conservation orders would be subject to prohibited col-
lateral attack3 9 which would burden the effective administration
35. Of. MacDonald v. Grande Corp., 148 So. 2d 441, 444 (La. App. 3d Cir.
1962) : "In exercising the broad powers granted to a mineral lessee by a lease,
the mineral lessee is under a duty to exercise them in accordance with the funda-
mental purpose for which they were granted .... The mineral lessee must there-
fore act in connection with the voluntary pooling power with good faith inten-
tions of serving the lessor-landowner's interest, or, at the very least, the mineral
lessee must not act in connection with such pooling power to the detriment of the
lessor-landowner's interest."
36. For other cases in the field of mineral rights based on the implied intent
of the parties, see Elson v. Mathewes, 224 La. 417, 69 So. 2d 734 (1954) ; Achee
v. Caillouet, 197 La. 313, 1 So. 2d 530 (1941) ; Mulhearne v. Hayne, 171 La.
1003, 132 So. 659 (1931).
37. The pooling clauses in the leases did not create the unit, but only em-
powered the lessee to do so. Since the lessee's power to pool is limited to the
creation of units as authorized by the lessor, any unit created would necessarily
'be subject to the conditions intended by the parties to the lease. However, a
problem would arise if a lessee stated in the unit declaration that the participa-
tions of the parties were to be frozen. Would the unit be void ab injtio or would
it merely be subject to the intended conditions regardless of the provision in the
unit declaration? See, e.g., the unitization agreement involved in Crown Cent.
Petroleum Corp. v. Barousse, 238 La. 1013, 117 So. 2d 575 (1960).
38. Obviously disputes will arise as to whether a particular event has the
effect of dissolving the sharing arrangements created by the declared unit. In
the instant case, the conservation unit defined the productive limits of the reser-
voir. The same result may follow in the case of conservation units created for
development purposes only, following convenient geographical boundaries and not
purporting to define the reservoir limits. It appears that these units too may
render the declared unit unnecessary for the purposes of conservation. Or, the
drilling of a dry hole on the declared unit, proving portions of the acreage cov-
ered thereby to be unproductive, would be an event which proved that the unit
no longer served the purposes of conservation, and may terminate the unit. See
Struss v. Stoddard, 258 S.W.2d 413 (Tex. Civ. App. 1953); cf. MacDonald v.
39. LA. R.S. 30:11 (1950); Mayer v. Tidewater Oil Co., 218 F. Supp. 611
(E.D. La. 1963) ; Smith v. Carter Oil Co., 104 F. Supp. 463 (E.D. La. 1954).
Grande Corp., 148 So. 2d 441 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962).
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of conservation laws.40 Consequently, an order unitizing a sand
overlain by the declared unit must operate as conclusive proof
of the occurrence of the dissolving condition. 41
As a final observation, it appears that a characterization of
a unit as declared or contractual is not determinative of its sur-
vival after the establishment of a conservation unit.4 2 Regard-
less of the manner in which the voluntary unit is formed, the
parties to either type unit may expressly manifest their intent
to freeze, or not freeze, their interests. 43 However, a significant
40. For example, from different interpretations of geological data, a convinc-
ing argument may be made for defining the limits of a particular reservoir dif-
ferently from the Commissioner of Conservation. In a private suit such as the
instant case, the court may find the evidence proves that the conservation unit
incorrectly defined these limits, and therefore should not terminate the declared
unit. In a later direct attack on the conservation order, the court would be
unable to overturn the order unless it be found to have been issued without sup-
porting evidence. See LA. R.S. 30:11 (1950) ; O'Meara v. Union Oil Co. of Calif.,
212 La. 745, 753, 33 So. 2d 506, 509 (1947) ; Moses, Louisiana Oil and Gas Con-
servation Law, 24 TUL. L. REV. 811 (1950).
Perhaps this is what the court had in mind in its reference to the conflict
with the conservation order in the instant case. See note 32 supra. To allow the
lessee to assert that the declared unit was still accomplishing the purposes for
which it was originally formed (i.e., conservation) would be in conflict with the
commissioner's order, which could be issued only for conservation purposes.
41. The obligations under the unit could be said to be subject to an implied
resolutory condition and automatically terminated upon the happening of the
condition. See LA. CiviL, CODE arts. 2021, 2026, 2047 (1870). The exact relation-
ships and obligations of those interested in a declared unit has never been defini-
tively decided. Certainly the lessor on whose land the well is drilled is obligated
to share unit production with the other lessors of acreage within the unit. If the
unit well be drilled on the land of another, the lessor has a right to demand his
proportionate share also. The question unanswered is to whom is the obligation
owed, and against whom can the right be asserted? It may be that the lessee
having the power to pool his lessor's land is acting as the agent of the lessor,
and upon the exercise of the power creates binding obligations between lessors
even as if they had been parties to the instrument which created the unit. See
MacDonald v. Grande Corp., 148 So. 2d 441 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) ; LA. CIVIL
CODE arts. 2985, 2986, 2995, 3021 (1870).
42. But see Texaco, Inc. v. Vermilion Parish School Bd., 145 So. 2d 383, 394
(La. App. 3d Cir. 1962) (concurring opinion). Here Judge Savoy, perhaps in-
tending to clarify the Jones decision, indicated that the court would presume that
the parties to a declared unit intended the unit to be subject to change by a sub-
sequent conservation unit, but would presume that the parties to a contractual
unit intended to freeze their interests.
Creating a presumption as to what the parties intended is in effect holding
that as a matter of law, certain legal consequences will flow unless the parties
expressly stipulate to the contrary. Perhaps it is less difficult for the court to
imply an intent to freeze participations in the contractual unit than in the de-
clared unit because of the lessor's direct participation in the confection of the
contractual unit. However, the manner in which the units are formed would not
seem to have sufficient bearing on the determination of whether the parties in-
tended to freeze their interests to give rise to such presumptions.
Consequently, it appears that the more desirable approach would be to employ
no Dresumption, but to ascertain the express or implied intent of the parties from
the language of the contract rather than predicate a result on presumptions based
on a classification of the unit. See LA. CIVIL CODE arts. 2284, 2288 (1870).
43. In a contractual unit the intent of all parties whose interests are pooled
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principle emerges from the instant case: if a lease contains a
pooling clause permitting declarations of units for conservation
purposes, an intent of the parties to freeze their interests will
not be presumed or implied, but must be expressed. Thus, the
draftsman of the lease must manifest such intent clearly and
unambiguously.
44
S. Patrick Phillips
SECURITY DEVICES - R.S. 9:4812- REQUIREMENT OF SUIT
WITHIN ONE YEAR ON MATERIALMAN'S LIEN
Plaintiff materialman furnished certain building materials
to contractor who had entered into an unrecorded written agree-
ment with landowner to construct a building. As provided by
R.S. 9:4812,1 plaintiff recorded his claim for the uncollected bal-
would be evidenced by the one instrument creating the unit. However, a problem
may arise when pooling clauses in leases on different tracts consolidated into a
declared unit evidence an opposite intention on the question whether a conserva-
tion unit would terminate the declared unit. It would appear that the lessor who
intended the termination would not be bound by the declared unit after the crea-
tion of the conservation unit. If the unit be terminated as to that lessor, it may
be terminated as to all lessors within the unit. Viator v. Haynesville Mercantile
Co., 230 La. 132, 88 So.2d 1 (1956) ; Union Oil Co. of California v. Touchet,
229 La. 306, 86 So. 2d 50 (1956) (unit invalid from its inception as to one
lessor is invalid from its inception as to all lessors of acreage purported to be
included within the unit).
44. See, e.g., the following provision in a standard lease form: "Any unit cre-
ated by Lessee hereunder shall also be revised so as to conform with an order of
a Regulatory Body issued after said unit was originally established; such revision
shall be effective as of the effective date of such order without further declara-
tion by lessee." Bath-O-Gram, Form 42 CPM-New South Louisiana Revised Six
(6)-Pooling.
1. LA. R.S. 9:4812 (1950) : "When the owner, or his authorized agent, under-
takes the work of construction, improvement, repair, erection, or reconstruction,
for the account of the owner, for which no contract has been entered into, or
when a contract has 'been entered into but has not been recorded, as and when
required, then any person furnishing service of material or performing any labor
on the said building or other work may record in the office of the clerk of court
or recorder of mortgages in the parish in which the said work is being done or
has been done, a copy of his estimate or an affidavit of his claim or any other
writing evidencing same, which recordation, if done within sixty days after the
date of the last delivery of all material upon the said property or the last per-
formance of all services or labor upon the same, by the said furnisher of material
or the said laborer, shall create a privilege upon the building or other structure
and upon the land upon which it is situated, in favor of any such person who
shall have performed service or labor or delivered material in connection with the
said work or improvement, as his interest may appear. The said privilege, re-
corded as aforesaid, shall constitute a privilege against the property for a period
of one year from the date of its filing, and may be enforced by a civil action in
any court of competent jurisdiction in the parish in which the land is situated
and such right of action shall prescribe within one year from the date of the
